FOURTH AMENDMENT
Removal proceedings are civil in nature and therefore need not strictly follow conventional rules of
evidence. See Matter of Barcenas, 19 I&N Dec. 609, 611 (BIA 1988). Evidence is admissible if it is
probative and its use is fundamentally fair. See id.; Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 505
(BIA 1980). An Immigration Judge may receive into evidence “any oral or written statement which is
material and relevant to any issue in the case previously made by the respondent or any other person
during any investigation, examination, hearing, or trial.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7. However, in removal
proceedings, a respondent has the right to a reasonable opportunity to examine and object to the
evidence against him, to present evidence on his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses
presented by the Government. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4).
When a respondent questions the legality of evidence, he must come forward with proof establishing a
prima facie case that the Government’s evidence was unlawfully obtained. See Barcenas, 19 I&N Dec.
at 611 (citations omitted). In meeting this burden, an affidavit alone is not sufficient, rather the
testimony of the movant is required. See id. at 611-12. Once a respondent makes a prima facie
showing, the burden shifts to the Government to prove that it obtained its evidence lawfully. See
Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. at 505 (citations omitted).
A respondent in removal proceedings cannot generally suppress evidence asserted to be procured in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (finding the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule inapplicable to deportation proceedings). However, evidence may
be suppressed if it was obtained through an egregious Fourth Amendment violation, or if the use of it
would be fundamentally unfair. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51; Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d
488, 493 (9th Cir. 1994). Evidence that is the fruit of the unlawful action is also suppressible. See
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980) and -, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). The Ninth Circuit
has interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez-Mendoza to allow for the application of the
exclusionary rule even if the probative value of the evidence acquired has not been undermined. See
Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1994); Cervantes-Cuevas v. INS, 797 F.2d
707, 710 (9th Cir. 1985).
A. Unreasonable Seizure
Though an immigration officer may stop and question a person in order to investigate whether he is
an alien lawfully present in the United States, this power is limited by the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. See INA § 287(a)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. §
287.3; INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) and Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 497 (9th Cir.
1994). An encounter with an officer may be transformed into a seizure “if, in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free
to leave.” Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215 (quoting United States v. Mendehall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
For a seizure to be reasonable, the officer “must articulate objective facts providing a reasonable
suspicion that the subject of the seizure was an alien illegally in this country.” Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at
497.
1. Seizure
The Ninth Circuit has identified several factors that indicate a seizure has occurred,
such as the presence of several officers, the display of a weapon, physical contact, or
the use of language or tone of voice indicating that an officer’s request might be
compelled. See Benitez-Mendez v. INS, 707 F.2d 1107, 1108 (9th Cir. 1983), rehr’g
granted and opinion modified, 752 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984). A seizure may occur
even “when the officer merely indicates by his authoritative manner that the person is
not free to leave.” Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 495. Furthermore, the officer’s failure to
warn the alien that he is free to refuse his requests and to terminate the encounter
weighs in favor of finding a seizure. See id. at 496.