2
When is there a “case?”
In Chavez, the Supreme Court stated: “In our view, a ‘criminal case’ at the very least requires the
initiation of legal proceedings.” “We need not decide today the precise moment when a ‘criminal
case’ commences; it is enough to say that police questioning does not constitute a ‘case’….”
Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550 (3d Cir. 2003)
, followed the Chavez case. In Renda, Trooper King
was investigating Renda’s allegations of domestic abuse against a state trooper who lived with
her. By telephone, Renda told King she had been slammed into a wall by the trooper at their
residence earlier that day during an argument. Renda also said she did not want to give a
statement or file charges and that she wanted to be left alone. After further investigation, King
interviewed Renda in-person at her friend’s apartment. He did not provide Miranda warnings to
Renda. She gave a written statement which did not mention the assault that she had reported
earlier that evening. When asked why, Renda admitted that she had lied earlier. Based upon that
statement, King then charged Renda with giving false reports to law enforcement authorities.
The state court suppressed Renda’s statements because she had not been given Miranda
warnings prior to what it concluded was a custodial interrogation. The District Attorney then
dismissed the case. Renda sued under Title 42 U.S.C. §1983.
The Third Circuit Court noted the factual difference between Chavez and Renda. In Chavez, the
plaintiff was never charged with a crime. In Renda, the plaintiff was charged with a crime but the
charges were later dropped after the state court suppressed the statements obtained in violation of
Miranda. The Court said that the plaintiff’s statement was used in a criminal case in one sense,
i.e., to develop probable cause sufficient to charge her. However, the court said, “It is the use of
coerced statements during a criminal trial, and not in obtaining an indictment, that violates the
Constitution.” (emphasis added). As such, Renda’s constitutional right against self-incrimination
was not violated. See also Jacobs v. Md. Dep't of Natural Res., 90 Fed. Appx. 677 (4th Cir.
2004).
Miranda
In Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428 (2000)
, the Supreme Court ruled that “Miranda announced a
constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.” The Miranda warnings have
taken on constitutional stature. (bold added). Is there civil liability then for failing to give the
warnings or giving them improperly?
In Chavez, six Supreme Court Justices agreed that mere custodial interrogation absent Miranda
warnings is not a basis for a Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim. The “procedural safeguards” required
by Miranda are “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but measures to insure that
the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected….” (see Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433 (1974)). “All the Fifth Amendment forbids is the introduction of coerced statements at
trial. Accordingly, Chavez’s failure to read Miranda warnings to Martinez did not violate
Martinez’s constitutional rights and cannot be grounds for a §1983 action.”
Following the guidance of Chavez, the Third Circuit Court in Renda held that a plaintiff may not
base a §1983 claim on the mere fact that the police questioned the plaintiff in custody without